GAME THEORY: MODELS OF CONFL SITUATIONS IN THE VOLGA VILLAGES OF THE EARLY XX CENTURY

Abstract

The article considers the applicability of game theory for the study of conflicts in peas­ant communes in the first half of the XX century. Game theory models can explain peas­ant motives and behavior and reconstruct the decision-making in the commune under the conflict. Game theory can become a part of the historical analysis for it is an inter­disciplinary approach that can reveal the logic of endogenous behavior within the com­mune and its interaction with external institutions and actors. The author provides dif­ferent definitions of game theory and considers its potential for the analysis of peasant life. The article defines principles and prerequisites for constructing a mathematical model of the peasant commune behavior under the conflict, and factors that motivate peasants to follow a certain line of actions and to choose specific strategies in differ­ent situations. The main problem of the game model is the dependence of each ‘player’ on the actions of other ‘players’. The author presents a cognitive mathematical model based on the clash of interests of a manager (willing to increase economic efficiency) and a commune (willing to ensure justice on the principles of a moral economy and ethics of survival). Thus, the author identifies transactional and information functions of peasant revolts.